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The Representation of the Cold War in History Textbooks.
Outline of a New Tool for analysis
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agenda for today:

I.   Theoretical Assumptions
II. Methodological Approach
III. Anchor Examples

I. Theoretical assumptions:

I.1. Two assumptions

- TBs in general tend to be ambivalent.
- TB narrations on the Cold War almost could not but be ambivalent

I.2. Theoretical underpinning: Three different images of the TB

- **Knoch**: TB as a dynamic palimpsest: bears the marks of hegemonic discourses from different times; we will thus as a rule find traces of different layers of memory cultures
- **Klerides**: TB as hybrid genre: reflects not only hegemonic meaning created by a certain discourse, but also struggle over meaning; upon careful reading we will thus came across bits and pieces of opposing arguments and claims
- **Kühlberger:** TB as multi-modal discourse: as a rule one page in a textbook is composed of different modes of producing meaning, from different sorts of texts to images and maps

Assumption on difference between "Palimcest" and "Hybrid genre":
- When I categorize an ambivalent quote as stemming from hybridity and the still undecided struggle in society over meaning, I assume that there still is nothing like a consensus in reach. If the ambivalence is perceived of being rooted in the palimpsest feature of the textbook we would rather assume a coexistence of at least two patterns that had enjoyed hegemony in different times.
- BUT: distinction can be verified by empirical research
- palimpsest: people from different generation that had been subjected to different layers of memory culture would read different things into the quote
- hybridity: people from different political opinions/preferences would read the quote differently

II. Methodological approach

II.1. strategy: coding based on grounded theory

- started with theoretically based codes
- that were then refined while applying them to our empirical material

II.2. coding on two different levels, provides answers to two different questions

- What kind of images are drawn from the main actors, from the images of the extended **SELF**, i.e. the West including FRG and USA on the one hand; and the extended other, i.e. USSR and GDR on the **OTHER** hand. So we call it **CODE FOR SELF AND OTHER**
- to what extent are these images stabilized and in how far did the discourse succeed to naturalize them; **We call this the code for the MODE OF NARRATION which signals a certain degree of stability and visibilty**

II.2. Coding categories for self and other

The coding for images of SELF and Other can refer to theoretical literature on the COLD WAR and the distinction made here between traditional and revisionist approaches which then would support certain images of the main actors.

These images in essence provide an answer to two questions

- Who is to blame for the outbreak of the Cold War
- Who is good for us and who is to blame for the partition of Germany?

II.3. Anchor examples for coding images of SELF and OTHER

EXTENDED WE=WEST	EXTENDED OTHER=EAST
two versions of the traditional image	**two versions of the traditional**
the empire of the universal good: eg. the USA were interested in spreading democracy and freedom all over the world	the USSR as the empire of the ideological evil: as a communist power the USSR is inevitably pursing an agenda of expansion
the empire of the particularistic good: the USA never really agreed to the enlargement expansion of Poland at the expense of Germany	the USSR as a backward, aggressive and therefore evil empire: as a backward power the USSR like Russia strives for expansion in order to compensate for its weakness
two versions of the revisionist image:	**two versions of the revisionist image**
the empire of greed and selfishness: the USA did pursue an agenda of making the world safe for democracy, being first and foremost capitalistic the strived for controlling markets and resources	*the USSR as a defensive power*: confronted with a capitalist and thus expansive opponent and moreover as a consequence from a tragic history, the USSR cannot but have a huge desire for security
the empire that never cared for us: The USA did not prevent the expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe	*the USSR as a power caught in a security dilemma (like the US):* the escalation of the Cold War was a result of fear and misunderstanding and was not caused by the intentions of actors

II. 4. Coding categories for mode of narration as signifying the degree of stabilization and naturalization of images

starting assumption:

- all meaning is arbitrary (de Saussure)
- links between significant and signifier are flee floating and thus in need of stabilization

consequence: how is power generated in discourse?

- by fixing meaning and establishing chains of equation like the USA means freedom and democracy
- by rendering the process of fixation invisible in order to naturalize it

operationalization: two questions addressed to fragments of a discourse

- What is the degree of stability reached when fixing meaning?
- What is the degree of visibility the text could not escape when trying to naturalize meaning?

II.5. Coding scheme for mode of narration as signifying the degree of stabilization and naturalization of images

	degree of stability	degree of visibility
common sense	high	low
Justification	low	high
Ambivalence	low	low

II. 6. Anchor examples for single codes for mode of narration

three aims
- render the scheme more plausible by showing you some examples of coded textbook quote
- analyze the coded quotes in order to gain an insight into the inner mechanism that make common sense assumption, justifications and ambivalences work
- arrive at more precise definitions

anchor example for common sense

 "The most important aim after the war was the reconstruction of the own country. The Sowjetunion wanted to use German reparation deliveries and American credits to achieve this. On the long run, head of state Stalin feared a conflict with the USA and other capitalist states.
KLETT, p. 72

two mechanism making common sense assumptions work

- According to the general logic inherent to a common sense assumption, you as a reader need to mobilize previous knowledge in order to understand a claim. This knowledge is implied as being comon sensical and thus there is no need to spell it out; in this case: (i)

the USSR devastated and weakened by the war could not but be mainly interested in recovery (ii) the USA as a capitalist state are naturally inclined to expansion there is thus a could reason to fear them

- But there is a second rather interesting feature. You need to have some previous knowledge on how to link two claims with one another. In this case, you can be expected to reconstruct the following causal chain between statements: (i) the USSR being mainly interested in recovery would not have a problem with cooperating with the USA (ii) It is due to the capitalist nature of the USA that this idea of cooperation could not have been realized

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function of common sense assumptions in discourse

- Just one general word on the function of common sense assumptions in discourse. Actually, they mark the point where discourse turns into ideology and is at the peak of his power
- And vice versa, potential opponents of a discourse are at the bottom of their power. They can hardly resist a claim expressed in the narrative mode of a common sense assumption because even they cannot recognize it as a claim
- To use an expression from Bourdieu, if common sense assumption work well they generate "*the recognition of legitimacy through misrecognition of arbitrariness'.*" (NF: 91)

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example justification:

Here we can distinguish two types depending on the question, WHO is justified

- If the one who should be justified is a member of one's own WE group, he is defended against a blame hanging in the air, but not necessarily spelled out.
- If the justification addresses a member of the group of the OTHER, he is fixed again to the image of the evil by dispersing the impression that he had done something good.

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example for justification the first type, i.e. justification of a positive image of the WE group

Currency reform in the Western Zones: The divide between the victorious powers grew wider and wider in the years between 1946 and 1949. The Western power united their zones. The hunger of the population was alleviated with American food. The reconstruction of a Western economic system was supported with credits from the USA. This help for the Western zones could be rendered only if the German money would gain in value. ... The rationing of many products and the control over prices could be canceled whereas the rationing of products lingered on for quite some time in the Soviet occupied zone that became later the GDR.
CORNELSEN, p. 110

mechanisms that make the justification work The whole chapter aims at rejecting the assumption that the Western allies contributed to a deepening of the German partition by creating facts like adopting a currency reform. The currency reform is justified on distinct levels.

- First of all it is described as a sheer necessity. Without it the money spent in the framework of the Marshall Plan could not have had any effect on the German economy. It

would have been wasted. In the light of this argument, the currency reform is no longer a cause that might have deepened partition. It is rather an effect of the Marshall Plan, a measure taken earlier and having an almost unopposed positive image.

- Not in the quote, but in the remainder of the chapter you will come across the traces of another argument. The whole narration tries to prove that despite the first impression that emerges only on the surface of things, it were the Soviets who created facts by imposing the socialist model on the economy of the Eastern part of Germany and thus almost completing the economic partition of the country. Seen against this backdrop, the USA who did nothing but restoring an economic order familiar to the Germans, could not but react to this situation with the adoption of the Marshall Plan.

example for the justification of the second type, i.e. for the justification of a negative image of the OTHER

"Until 1954 the policies of the GDR and of the Soviet Union aimed at re-unifcation. Both states were, however, not ready to accept free and democratic elections in West and East Germany."
KLETT, p. 108

mechanisms making the justification work

- The OTHER, i.e. the GDR and the USSR are credited with having done something which is constructed as being good: they have suggested plans for a reunification of Germany.
- In order to restore the image of the evil other, which is in danger of being destabilized by such a claim, the text hurries up to emphasize, that the price they would have demanded for the realization of the German dream, would have been too high. They would have asked the West-Germans to sacrifice democracy.

defining the features of a justification by contrasting them with common sense assumptions

- Justifications could be defined as former common sense assumption that have become the targets of doubt and are in need of being stabilized again. What is stabilized in this case is the assumption that the Soviet OTHER could never really want something good for us. There must be some kind of hitch.

Examples for ambivalence

types of ambivalence

- The defining criteria for distinguishing between different types of ambivalent quotes are here not SOURCES of ambivalence like coexistence between different layers of memory culture or social struggle over meaning
- but rather LINGUISTIC MEANS applied in order to generate ambivalence

example for ambivalent link between claims

Soviet Union - Victorious Power: (i) At the end of the Second World War the Soviet Union had suffered the loss of over 20 million war-dead and large parts of the country were completely devastated. (ii) Yet the Red Army managed to occupy the majority of Eastern Europe

and advanced as far as Germany. (iii) Those regions were now under Soviet control and signified a great gain in power. (iv) The most important objective after the war was the reconstruction of one's own country.
 KLETT: p. 72

Mechanisms
- competing claims: (i) Soviet Union was a victim/weakened by war (ii) Soviet Union was expansive, aggressive and power hungry (iii) Soviet Union was mainly interested in recovery
- no clear idea of how to create coherence between these claims; rather poor attempt at linking them by the conjunction "yet" indicating an opposition
- vagueness with regard to the question of where the opposition actually lies: (i) is it surprising that a country weakened by war would be able to launch an aggression) (ii) Or is it surprising that a former victim turns into a perpetrator?
- depending on my answers to this question I would make different sense from the conjunction yet

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example for rendering invisible the attribution of responsibility

Student movement in the West: The student protests added considerable heat to the domestic political climate. The demonstrators not infrequently clashed with the police in street battles. The climax of the clashes was the attempted assassination of Rudi Dutschke, which led to the most serious riots of the post-war years.
KLETT, p. 122

Mechanism
- The passage is ambiguous because it gives us no clue of who did what to whom. Rather vaguely it speaks of students protests and not of students or alternatively of police men as the cause for clashes. As we see, the use of nominalisation impedes the attribution of responsibility.
- As a result, quite a lot of questions remain open: Who was responsible for the escalation of the domestic political climate? Whose fault is it that the demonstrations culminated in street battles with the police? Who made the assassination attempt on Dutschke? Who was responsible for the riots?

For one second, I would like to switch to another lever of argumentation. Upon careful reading, this quote could serve, I guess, also as an example for a type of ambivalence as resulting from the coexistence of different layers of memory cultures? Actually it can be read as a proof to the decreasing social power of the patterns of interpretations as suggested or even imposed by the generation of 68, I guess, whose members once were even among federal ministers but who could be said to experience now something like a marginalization. The

same phenomenon is, according to my impression, responsible for a discoursive shift in representations on NS

Having said all this, I would like to suggest some defining features of ambivalence by means of organizing a comparison with what I have said about common sense assumptions

- First of all, I would like to draw your attention to as striking insight: Obviously, mechanisms that make ambivalences work, do have a lot in common with common sense assumption. If you remember, common sense assumptions can also use underspecified links between two or more claims. They can also render invisible the attribution of responsibility. But if they nevertheless work, it is because the ideal reader as presupposed by the text would mobilize previously accumulated knowledge in order to fill in the gap left open by the text itself.
- Having that in mind, we would like to suggest a definition that constructs ambivalences as not functioning common sense assumption. Or to repeat the same thing as looked upon from the opposite angel: ambivalences do not give us a clue about what would be the ideal reader as presupposed by the text.
- Theoretically speaking, we could distinguish between different causes for the failure of ambivalences to function
  A statement that previously could have been labeled as common sensical ceased to function because of a change in discourse
  A statement is referring to events for which there still is not social consensus on how to make sense out of them
  Two common sensical but opposing statements are combined in one statement and thus start to create tension